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GAMES FOR PUCCI’S MAXIMAL OPERATORS
PABLO BLANC, JUAN J. MANFREDI, AND JULIO D. ROSSI
Abstract. In this paper we introduce a game whose value functions converge (as a param-
eter that measures the size of the steps goes to zero) uniformly to solutions to the second
order Pucci maximal operators.
1. Introduction
Our main goal in this paper is to describe a game whose values approximate viscosity
solutions to the maximal Pucci problem
(1.1)


P+λ,Λ(D
2u) := Λ
∑
λj>0
λj + λ
∑
λj<0
λj = f, in Ω,
u = g, on ∂Ω.
HereD2u is the Hessian matrix and λi(D
2u) denote its eigenvalues. The function f is assumed
to be uniformly continuous. We assume that the ellipticity constants verify Λ > λ > 0.
Let us describe the game that we propose to approximate solutions to (1.1). It is a single
player game (that tries to maximize the expected outcome). It can also be viewed as a
optimal control problem. Fix a bounded domain Ω ⊂ RN that satisfies a uniform exterior
sphere condition. Fix a running payoff function f : Ω 7→ R and a final payoff function
g : RN \ Ω 7→ R.
The rules of the game are as follows: a token is placed at an initial position x0 ∈ Ω, the
player chooses an orthonormal basis of RN , v1, ..., vN and then, for each vi, he chooses either
µi =
√
λ or µi =
√
Λ. Then the position of the token is moved to x ± εµivi with equal
probabilities 12N . The game continues until the position of the token leaves the domain and
at this point xτ the payoff is given by g(xτ )− 12N ε2
∑τ−1
k=0 f(xk). For a given strategy SI (the
player choses an orthonormal basis and the set of corresponding µi at every step of the game)
we compute the expected outcome as
E
x0
SI
[
g(xτ )− 1
2N
ε2
τ−1∑
k=0
f(xk)
]
.
Then the value of the game for any x0 ∈ Ω is defined as
uε(x0) := sup
SI
E
x0
SI
[
g(xτ )− 1
2N
ε2
τ−1∑
k=0
f(xk)
]
.
Our first result states that the value of this game verifies a Dynamic Programming Principle.
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Theorem 1. The value of the game uε verifies
(1.2)


uε(x) = − 1
2N
ε2f(x) +
1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
uε(x+ εµivi) + u
ε(x− εµivi) x ∈ Ω,
uε(x) = g(x) x 6∈ Ω.
Our next goal is to look for the limit as ε→ 0.
Theorem 2. Let uε be the values of the game. Then,
(1.3) uε → u, as ε→ 0,
uniformly in Ω. The limit u is the unique viscosity solution to
(1.4)


P+λ,Λ(D
2u) := Λ
∑
λj>0
λj + λ
∑
λj<0
λj = f, in Ω,
u = g, on ∂Ω.
Remark 3. When f is assumed to be positive, one can play the game described before, but
with the following variant: the player chooses v1, ..., vk orthonormal vectors (notice that the
number of vectors k is part of the Player’s choice). Then, the new position of the game goes
to x ± ε√Λvi with equal probabilities 1/2N or remain fixed at x with probability 1 − k/N .
(note that there is no choice of µi among λ, Λ). In this case the value of the game u
ε verifies

uε(x) = − 1
2N
ε2f(x) +
1
2N
sup
vi
k∑
i=1
uε(x+ ε
√
Λvi) + u
ε(x− ε
√
Λvi) +
N − k
N
uε(x) x ∈ Ω,
uε(x) = g(x) x 6∈ Ω.
Now, with the same ideas used to deal with Pucci’s maximal operator, one can pass to the
limit as ε→ 0 and find a viscosity solution to the degenerate problem

P+0,Λ(D
2u) := Λ
∑
λj>0
λj = f, in Ω,
u = g, on ∂Ω.
Notice that the requirement on f to be positive is nessary in order to have a solution to the
limit equation. When one adapts the proofs in the following sections to this case the key fact
is that for f positive the player wants to end the game instead of continue playing for a long
time (since at each move he is paying a running payoff that is strictly positive.
2. Proofs of the results
We begin by stating the usual definition of a viscosity solution to (1.1). Here and in what
follows Ω is a domain in RN . We refer to [3] for general results on viscosity solutions.
Definition 4. A continuous function u verifies
P+λ,Λ(D
2u) := Λ
∑
λj>0
λj + λ
∑
λj<0
λj = f
in the viscosity sense in Ω if
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(1) for every φ ∈ C2 such that u − φ has a strict minimum at the point x ∈ Ω with
u(x) = φ(x), we have
P+λ,Λ(D
2u)(x) := Λ
∑
λj>0
λj(D
2u)(x) + λ
∑
λj<0
λj(D
2u)(x) ≤ f(x).
(2) for every ψ ∈ C2 such that u − ψ has a strict maximum at the point x ∈ Ω with
u(x) = ψ(x), we have
P+λ,Λ(D
2u) := Λ
∑
λj>0
λj(D
2u)(x) + λ
∑
λj<0
λj(D
2u)(x) ≥ f(x).
Now, let us describe in detail the game that we are presenting in this manuscript. After
that, we prove Theorems 1 and 2.
Let Ω ⊂ RN be a bounded open set and ε > 0 a fixed real number. The game starts with
a token placed at an initial position x0 ∈ Ω. At every step, the only player, Player I, chooses
an orthonormal basis of RN , v1, ..., vN and then for each vi he chooses either µi =
√
λ or
µi =
√
Λ. Then the position of the token is moved to x±εµivi with equal probabilities. That
is, each position is selected with probability 12N . After the first round, the game continues
from x1 according to the same rules. This procedure yields a possibly infinite sequence of
game states x0, x1, . . . where every xk is a random variable. The game ends when the token
leaves Ω, at this point the token will be in the boundary strip of width α = εmax{
√
λ,
√
Λ},
given by
Γα = {x ∈ RN \ Ω : dist(x, ∂Ω) ≤ α}.
We denote by xτ ∈ Γα the first point in the sequence of game states that lies in Γα, so
that τ refers to the first time we hit Γα. The payoff is determined by two given functions:
g : RN \ Ω → R, the final payoff function, and f : Ω → R, the running payoff function. We
require g to be continuous and bounded and f to be uniformly continuous and also bounded.
When the game ends, the total payoff is given by
g(xτ )− 1
2N
ε2
τ−1∑
k=0
f(xk).
We can think that when the token leaves a point xk, Player I must pay
1
2N ε
2f(xk) to move
to the next position and at the end he receives g(xτ ).
A strategy SI for Player I is a Borel function defined on the partial histories that gives a
orthonormal base and values µi at every step of the game
SI(x0, x1, . . . , xn) = (v1, . . . , vN , µ1, . . . , µN ).
When Player I fix his strategy SI we can compute the expected outcome as follows: Given
the sequence x0, . . . , xn with xk ∈ Ω the next game position is distributed according to the
probability
πSI(x0, . . . , xn, A) =
1
2N
∑
vi,µi
δxn+εµivi(A) + δxn−εµivi(A)
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where (v1, . . . , vN , µ1, . . . , µN ) = SI(x0, x1, . . . , xn). By using the Kolmogorov’s extension
theorem and the one step transition probabilities, we can build a probability measure Px0SI on
the game sequences. The expected payoff, when starting from x0 and using the strategy SI,
is
(2.5) Ex0SI
[
g(xτ )− 1
2N
ε2
τ−1∑
k=0
f(xk)
]
=
∫
H∞
(
g(xτ )− 1
2N
ε2
τ−1∑
k=0
f(xk)
)
dPx0SI .
The value of the game is given by
uε(x0) = sup
SI
E
x0
SI
[
g(xτ )− 1
2N
ε2
τ−1∑
k=0
f(xk)
]
.
Lemma 5. The sequence of random variables
{|xk − x0|2 − k λ ǫ2}k≥1
is a supermartingale with respect to the natural filtration
{Fx0k }n≥1.
Proof. Let us compute
E
x0
SI
[|xk − x0|2 | Fx0k−1] (xk−1) = 12N
N∑
i=1
|xk−1 − x0 + εµivi|2 + |xk−1 − x0 − εµivi|2
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
|xk−1 − x0|2 + ε2µ2i
= |xk−1 − x0|2 + ε2 1
N
N∑
i=1
µ2i
≥ |xk−1 − x0|2 + ε2λ.
Therefore, we have
E
x0
SI
[|xk − x0|2 − k λ ǫ2 | Fx0k−1] (xk−1) ≥ |xk−1 − x0|2 + ε2λ− k λǫ2
= |xk−1 − x0|2 − (k − 1)λε2,
as we wanted to show. 
Applying Doob’s optional stopping to the finite stopping times τ ∧ n and letting n →∞,
we obtain
E
x0
SI
[|xτ − x0|2 − τ λ ǫ2] ≥ 0,
(2.6) λ ǫ2Ex0SI [τ ] ≤ E
x0
SI
[|xτ − x0|2] ≤ C(Ω) <∞
and the process ends almost surely:
(2.7) Px0SI ({τ <∞}) = 1.
We conclude that the expectation (2.5) is well defined.
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To see that the game value satisfies the DPP, we can consider u˜ε, a function that satisfies
the DPP

u˜ε(x) = − 1
2N
ε2f(x) +
1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
u˜ε(x+ εµivi) + u˜
ε(x− εµivi) x ∈ Ω,
u˜ε(x) = g(x) x 6∈ Ω.
The existence of such a function can be seen by Perron’s method. In fact, the operator given
by the RHS of the DPP, that is,
u 7→ − 1
2N
ε2f(x) +
1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
u(x+ εµivi) + u˜(x− εµivi)
is in the hypotheses of the main result of [12].
Recall that we want to prove that u˜ε = uε. Given η > 0 we can consider the strategy S0I
for Player I that at every step almost maximize
1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
[
u˜ε(x+ εµivi) + u˜
ε(x− εµivi)
]
,
that is, we take
S0I (x0, x1, . . . , xn) = (w1, . . . , wN , ν1, . . . , νN )
such that
1
2N
N∑
i=1
u˜ε(xn + ενiwi) + u˜
ε(xn − ενiwi) ≥
1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
u˜ε(xn + εµivi) + u˜
ε(xn − εµivi)− η2−(n+1).
With this choice of the strategy we have
E
x0
S0
I
[u˜ε(xn+1)− 1
2N
ε2
n∑
k=0
f(xk)− η2−(n+1)|x0, . . . , xk]
≥ 1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
u˜ε(xn + εµivi) + u˜
ε(xn − εµivi)− 1
2N
ε2
n∑
k=0
f(xk)− η2−(n+1) − η2−(n+1)
≥ u˜ε(xn)− η2−n − 1
2N
ε2
n−1∑
k=0
f(xk),
here we have used that the DPP holds at xn for u˜
ε. That is we have proved that
Mn = u˜
ε(xn)− η2−n − 1
2N
ε2
n−1∑
k=0
f(xk)
is a submartingale with respect to the natural filtration.
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Next , we compute
uε(x0) = sup
SI
E
x0
SI
[
g(xτ )− 1
2N
ε2
τ−1∑
k=0
f(xk)
]
≥ Ex0
S0
I
[
g(xτ )− 1
2N
ε2
τ−1∑
k=0
f(xk)
]
≥ Ex0
S0
I
[
g(xτ )− 1
2N
ε2
τ−1∑
k=0
f(xk)− η2−τ
]
≥ lim inf
n→∞ E
x0
S0
I
[Mτ∧n] = Ex0S0
I
[M0] = u˜
ε(x0)− η,
where τ ∧ n = min(τ, n), where we have used the optional stopping theorem for Mn. Since η
is arbitrary this proves that uε ≥ u˜ε. Analogously, we have
E
x0
S0
I
[u˜ε(xn+1)− 1
2N
ε2
n∑
k=0
f(xk)|x0, . . . , xk]
≤ 1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
u˜ε(xn + εµivi) + u˜
ε(xn − εµivi)− 1
2N
ε2
n∑
k=0
f(xk)
≤ u˜ε(xn)− 1
2N
ε2
n−1∑
k=0
f(xk),
where we have estimated the strategy for Player I by the supremum. Hence,
Mn = u˜
ε(xn)− 1
2N
ε2
n−1∑
k=0
f(xk),
is a supermartingale. Now, we have
uε(x0) = sup
SI
E
x0
SI
[
g(xτ )− 1
2N
ε2
τ−1∑
k=0
f(xk)
]
≤ lim sup
n→∞
E
x0
S0
I
[Mτ∧n] = Ex0S0
I
[M0] = u˜
ε(x0).
This proves that uε ≤ u˜ε. We have proved that uε = u˜ε, and hence Theorem 1.4 follows.
Now our aim is to pass to the limit in the values of the game
uε → u, as ε→ 0
and obtain in this limit process a viscosity solution to (1.1).
To obtain a convergent subsequence uε → u we will use the following Arzela-Ascoli type
lemma. For its proof see Lemma 4.2 from [9].
Lemma 6. Let {uε : Ω→ R, ε > 0} be a set of functions such that
(1) there exists C > 0 such that |uε(x)| < C for every ε > 0 and every x ∈ Ω,
(2) given η > 0 there are constants r0 and ε0 such that for every ε < ε0 and any x, y ∈ Ω
with |x− y| < r0 it holds
|uε(x)− uε(y)| < η.
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Then, there exists a uniformly continuous function u : Ω→ R and a subsequence still denoted
by {uε} such that
uε → u uniformly in Ω,
as ε→ 0.
So our task now is to show that the family uε satisfies the hypotheses of the previous
lemma. Let us start by showing that the family is uniformly bounded.
Lemma 7. There exists C > 0 such that |uε(x)| < C for every ε > 0 and every x ∈ Ω.
Proof. We consider R > 0 such that Ω ⊂ BR(0) and set Mn = |xn|2. From the bound (2.6)
we get
E
x0
SI
[τ ] ≤ 4R
2
λ
1
ε2
.
Next, we claim that
min g − 2R
2max |f |
Nλ
≤ uε(x) ≤ max g + 2R
2max |f |
Nλ
for every x ∈ Ω. In fact,
uε(x0) = sup
SI
E
x0
SI
[
g(xτ )− 1
2N
ε2
τ−1∑
k=0
f(xk)
]
≤ max g + sup
SI
E
x0
SI
[
− 1
2N
ε2
τ−1∑
k=0
f(xk)
]
≤ max g + 1
2N
ε2max |f | sup
SI
E
x0
SI
[τ ]
≤ max g + 1
2N
ε2max |f |4R
2
λ
1
ε2
≤ max g + 2R
2max |f |
Nλ
.
The lower bound can be obtained analogously. 
Next, we prove that the family satisfies condition (2) in Lemma 6. To this end, we follow
ideas from [9]. First, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Let us consider the game played in an annular domain BR(y) \Bδ(y). Then, the
exit time τ∗ of the game starting at x0 verifies
E
x0(τ∗) ≤ C(R/δ) dist(∂Bδ(y), x0) + o(1)
ε2
,(2.8)
for x0 ∈ BR(y) \Bδ(y). Here o(1) → 0 as ε→ 0 can be taken depending only on δ and R.
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Proof. Let us denote
gε(x) = E
x(τ).
Since gε is invariant under rotations, we know that gε is radial.
If we assume that the player wants to maximize the expectation for the exit time, we have
that the function gε satisfies a dynamic programming principle
gε(x) = 1 +
1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
[
gε(x+ εµivi) + gε(x− εµivi)
]
by the above assumptions and that the number of steps always increases by one when making
a step. Further, we denote hε(x) = ε
2gε(x) and obtain
hε(x) = ε
2 +
1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
[
hε(x+ εµivi) + hε(x− εµivi)
]
.
If we rewrite the equation as
−N = sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
µ2i
[hε(x+ εµivi) + hε(x− εµivi)− 2hε(x)
2ε2µ2i
]
we obtain a discrete version of the PDE
−N = sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
µ2i
∂2h
∂v2i
.
We denote r = |x− y|. Since h is radial, it’s eigenvalues are (h)rr with multiplicity 1 and
(h)r
r
with multiplicity N−1. We will look for a solution u(r), concave and radially increasing.
It will verify
−N = λurr + (n− 1)Λur
r
.
It’s solution takes the form
u(r) = − Nr
2
2(Λ(N − 1) + λ) + a
r1−
Λ(N−1)
λ
1− Λ(N−1)
λ
+ b,
if λ 6= Λ(N − 1) and
u(r) = − Nr
2
2(Λ(N − 1) + λ) + a log(r) + b,
if λ = Λ(N−1). Here a and b are two constants. We consider u defined in x ∈ BR+δ(y)\Bδ(y).
We can choose a and b such that u′(R+δ) = 0, u(δ) = 0 and such that the function is positive.
The resulting u is concave and radially increasing. In fact, we have
u′(r) = − Nr
Λ(N − 1) + λ + ar
−Λ(N−1)
λ .
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Then, from u′(R+ δ) = 0 we conclude that
u′(r) =
N(R+ δ)
Λ(N − 1) + λ

− r
R+ δ
+
(
r
R+ δ
)−Λ(N−1)
λ


which is positive when r < R+δ. This shows that u is increasing with respect to r. Moreover,
u is concave as a function of r,
λurr = −N − (n− 1)Λur
r
< 0.
We extend this function as a solution to the same equation to Bδ(y) \ Bδ−√Λǫ(y). If we
consider ε
√
Λ < δ, for each x ∈ BR(y) \ Bδ(y) we have x ± εµivi ⊂ BR+δ(y) \ Bδ−√Λǫ(y).
Since
−N = sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
µ2i
∂2u
∂v2i
,
and u is smooth we get
−N = sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
µ2i
[u(x+ εµivi) + u(x− εµivi)− 2u(x)
2ε2µ2i
]
+ o(1)
and hence
u(x) = ε2 +
1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
[
u(x+ εµivi) + u(x− εµivi)
]
+ o(ε2).
Then, for ε small enough
u(x) ≥ ε
2
2
+
1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
[
u(x+ εµivi) + u(x− εµivi)
]
.
Now, we consider w defined as u in BR(y) and zero outside. Observe that we have
w(x) ≥ ε
2
2
+
1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
[
w(x+ εµivi) + w(x− εµivi)
]
.
for every x ∈ BR(y) \Bδ(y).
It follows that
E[w(xk) +
k
2
ε2|x0, . . . , xk−1]
≤ 1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
[
w(xk−1 + εµivi) +w(xk−1 − εµivi)
]
+
k
2
ε2.
≤ w(xk−1) + k − 1
2
ε2,
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if xk−1 ∈ BR(y) \ Bδ(y). Thus w(xk) + k2ε2 is a supermartingale, and the optional stopping
theorem yields
E
x0 [w(xτ∗∧k) +
1
2
(τ∗ ∧ k)ε2] ≤ w(x0).
For xτ∗ outside BR(y) we have w(xτ∗) = 0 and for xτ∗ ∈ Bδ(y) \Bδ−√Λǫ(y) we have
−w(xτ∗) ≤ o(1).
Furthermore, the estimate
0 ≤ w(x0) ≤ C(R/δ) dist(∂Bδ(y), x0)
holds for the solutions due to the facts that they are concave and verify w = 0 on ∂Bδ(y).
Thus, passing to the limit as k →∞, we obtain
1
2
ε2Ex0 [τ∗] ≤ w(x0)− E[w(xτ∗)] ≤ C(R/δ) dist(∂Bδ(y), x0) + o(1).
This completes the proof. 
We are ready to prove that the family uε is asymptotically equicontinuous.
Lemma 9. Given η > 0 there are constants r0 and ε0 such that for every ε < ε0 and any
x, y ∈ Ω with |x− y| < r0 it holds
|uε(x)− uε(y)| < η.
Proof. Given ε0 we consider the boundary strip of width α0 = ε0
√
Λ given by
Γα0 = {x ∈ RN \ Ω : dist(x, ∂Ω) < α0}.
The case x, y ∈ Γα0 follows from the uniformity continuity of g in Γα0 (which is compact).
Observe that the Lemma only includes those x, y ∈ ∂Ω. Although here we are interested in
x, y ∈ Γα0 since we will consider the game in our arguments and the token may lie outside Ω.
For the case x, y ∈ Ω we argue as follows. We fix the strategy S0I for the game starting
at x. We consider a virtual game starting at y. We use the same random steps as the game
starting at x. Furthermore, the player adopts the strategy S0I from the game starting at x,
that is, when the game position is at yk the player makes the choices that would have taken
at xk = yk − y + x for the game starting at x. At every time we have |xk − yk| = |x − y|.
We proceed in this way until for the first time xn ∈ Γα0 or yn ∈ Γα0 . We can separate the
payoff in the amount paid by the player up to this moment and the payoff for the rest of the
game. The difference in the payoff for the rest of the game can be bounded with the desired
estimate in the case xn ∈ Ω, yn ∈ Γα0 or for xn, yn ∈ Γα0 . The difference for the amount paid
by the player before xn or yn reaches Γα0 , that is,
1
2N ε
2
∑n−1
k=0 f(xk)− f(yk) can be bounded
considering the bound for the expected exit time obtained in the proof of Lemma 7 and the
fact that f is uniformly continuous. In fact we have,
E
(∣∣∣∣∣ 12N ε2
n−1∑
k=0
f(xk)− f(yk)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
≤ R
2
Nλ
ωf (|x− y|)
where ωf stands for the uniform modulus of continuity of f .
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Thus, we can concentrate on the case x ∈ Ω and y ∈ Γα0 . By the exterior sphere condition,
there exists Bδ(z) ⊂ RN \Ω such that y ∈ ∂Bδ(z). For a small δ we know that the difference
|g(y)− g(z)| is small, it remains to prove that the difference |uε(x)− g(z)| is small.
We take ε0 such that α0 <
δ
2 . Then
Mk = |xk − z| − Λ
δ
ε2k.
is a supermartingale. Indeed,
E
x0
SI
[|xk − z| |x0, . . . , xk−1] ≤ max
||v||=1,α∈{√λ,√Λ}
|xk−1 − z + εvα|+ |xk−1 − z − εvλ|
2
≤ max
||v||=1,α∈{√λ,√Λ}
√
|xk−1 − z + εvα|2 + |xk−1 − z − εvλ|2
2
≤ max
||v||=1,α∈{
√
λ,
√
Λ}
√
|xk−1 − z|2 + |εvα|2
≤ |xk−1 − z|+ ε
2Λ
2|xk−1 − z|
≤ |xk−1 − z|+ Λε
2
δ
.
The last inequality holds because |xk−1 − z| > δ2 .
Then, the optional stopping theorem implies that
E
x
SI
[|xτ − z|] ≤ |x− z|+ Λ
δ
ε2ExSI [τ ].
Next we estimate ExSI[τ ] by the stopping time in Lemma 8, for R such that Ω ⊂ BR\Bδ(z).
In fact, if we play our game in BR \ Bδ(z) we can reproduce the same movements until we
exit Ω (this happens before the game in BR \ Bδ(z) ends since Ω ⊂ BR \ Bδ(z)) and hence
we get that, for any strategy SI , it holds that
E
x
SI
[τ ] ≤ ExSI [τ∗].
Note that any strategy in the domain Ω can be extended to a strategy to the larger ring
domain. Thus, it follows from (2.8) that
E
x
SI
[|xτ − z|] ≤ |x− z|+ Λ
δ
(
C(R/δ) dist(∂Bδ(z), x0) + o(1)
)
.
Since dist(∂Bδ(z), x0) ≤ |x− y| and |x− z| ≤ |x− y|+ δ, we have
E
x
SI
[|xτ − z|] ≤ δ +
(
1 +
Λ
δ
C(R/δ)
)
|x− y|+ o(1).
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Thus, we have obtained bounds for ExSI [|xτ − z|] and ε2ExSI [τ ]. Using these bounds and the
fact that g is uniformly continuous, we have∣∣∣∣∣Ex0SI
[
g(xτ )− 1
2N
ε2
τ−1∑
k=0
f(xk)
]
− g(z)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ Ex0SI [|g(xτ )− g(z)|] +
1
2N
ε2ExSI [τ ]‖f‖∞
≤ Ex0SI [|g(xτ )− g(z)|] +
1
2N
ε2ExSI [τ ]‖f‖∞
≤ PxSI(|xτ − z| ≥ θ)2‖g‖∞ + sup‖x−y‖<θ
‖g(x) − g(y)‖ + 1
2N
ε2ExSI [τ ]‖f‖∞
≤ ExSI [|xτ − z|]
2
θ
‖g‖∞ + sup
‖x−y‖<θ
‖g(x) − g(y)‖ + 1
2N
ε2ExSI [τ ]‖f‖∞ < η
for θ, δ, ε0 and r0 small enough. Since this holds for every SI, we have obtained
|uε(x)− g(z)| < η,
completing the proof. 
From Lemma 7 and Lemma 9 we have that the hypotheses of the Arzela-Ascoli type
lemma, Lemma 6, are satisfied. Hence we have obtained uniform convergence of uε along a
subsequence.
Corollary 10. There exists a sequence εj → 0 and u, a continuous function in Ω, such that
uε → u
uniformly in Ω.
Our next task is to show that this limit is a solution to (1.4). This ends the proof of
Theorem 2. Notice that, since we have uniqueness of solutions to the limit problem we get
convergence of the whole family {uε} as ε→ 0.
Theorem 11. Let uε be the values of the game. Then, the uniform limit of uε, u, is the
unique viscosity solution to
(2.9)


P+λ,Λ(D
2u) := Λ
∑
λj>0
λj + λ
∑
λj<0
λj = f, in Ω,
u = g, on ∂Ω.
Proof. First, we observe that since uε = g on ∂Ω we obtain, form the uniform convergence,
that u = g on ∂Ω.
To check that u is a viscosity solution to P+λ,Λ(D
2u) = f in Ω, in the sense of Definition 4,
let φ ∈ C2 be such that u − φ has a strict minimum at the point x ∈ Ω with u(x) = φ(x).
We have to check that
P+λ,Λ(D
2φ(x)) − f(x) ≤ 0.
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As uε → u uniformly in Ω we have the existence of a sequence xε such that xε → x as ε→ 0
and
uε(z)− φ(z) ≥ uε(xε)− φ(xε)− ε3
(remark that uǫ is not continuous in general). Since uε is a solution to the DPP
uε(x) = − 1
2N
ε2f(x) +
1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
uε(x+ εµivi) + u
ε(x− εµivi)
we obtain that φ verifies the inequality
0 ≥ − 1
2N
ε2f(xε) +
1
2N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
[
φ(xε + εµivi) + φ(xε − εµivi)− φ(xε)
]
− ε3.
Now, consider the Taylor expansion of the second order of φ
φ(y) = φ(x) +∇φ(x) · (y − x) + 1
2
〈D2φ(x)(y − x), (y − x)〉+ o(|y − x|2)
as |y − x| → 0. Hence, we have
(2.10) φ(x+ εµv) = φ(x) + εµ∇φ(x) · v + ε2 1
2
µ2〈D2φ(x)v, v〉 + o(ε2)
and
(2.11) φ(x− εµv) = φ(x)− εµ∇φ(x) · v + ε2 1
2
µ2〈D2φ(x)v, v〉 + o(ǫ2).
Hence, using these expansions we get
1
2
φ(xε + εµv) +
1
2
φ(xε − εµv)− φ(xε) = ε
2
2
µ2〈D2φ(xε)v, v〉 + o(ε2),
and then we conclude that
0 ≥ − 1
2N
ε2f(xε) +
ε2
2
1
N
sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
[
µ2i 〈D2φ(xε)vi, vi〉
]
+ o(ε2).
Dividing by ε2/2N and passing to the limit as ε→ 0 we get
0 ≥ −f(x) + sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
[
µ2i 〈D2φ(x)vi, vi〉
]
,
that is,
0 ≥ −f(x) + sup
vi,µi
N∑
i=1
[
µ2i 〈D2φ(x)vi, vi〉
]
= −f(x) + sup
vi

Λ ∑
〈D2φ(x)vi,vi〉>0
〈D2φ(x)vi, vi〉+ λ
∑
〈D2φ(x)vi,vi〉<0
〈D2φ(x)vi, vi〉


= −f(x) +

Λ ∑
λj(D2φ(x))>0
λj(D
2φ(x)) + λ
∑
λj(D2φ(x))<0
λj(D
2φ(x))


as we wanted to show.
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The reverse inequality when a smooth function ψ touches u from below can be obtained
in a similar way. 
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